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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GLORIA HAYLEY ASHBY,
Case No. 20070362-CA

Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
DALLEN BEN ASHBY,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
Appellant, Gloria Hayley Ashby (“Ms. Ashby”), appeals from the trial
court’s denial of an award of alimony to Ms. Ashby in the memorandum decision
entered January 2, 2008, and in the trial court’s order entered on February 12,
2008. This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in denying Ms. Ashby’s request for an
award of alimony?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court reviews a decision
denying an award of alimony for an abuse of discretion. Richardson v.
Richardson, 2008 UT 57, ¶ 5; Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997).
ISSUE: Whether certain of the trial court’s factual findings were clearly
erroneous?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court’s findings of fact are subject to
clear error review. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah
1989).
ISSUE: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider
Mr. Ashby’s fault in determining whether to award alimony to Ms. Ashby?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court’s decision to consider or not
consider the parties’ fault in determining alimony should be subject to an abuse of
discretion standard. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(b); State v. Montiel, 2005 UT 48
¶¶ 9, 20; 122 P.3d 571, 575, 578.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Selected subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (included in Addendum)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Ms. Ashby filed a complaint for divorce in the Third District Court on

October 11, 2007. In addition to pleading a cause of action for divorce, the
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complaint alleged that Mr. Ashby had breached his contract with Ms. Ashby and
was therefore liable for damages. Appendix at 1-3.
2.

On April 12, 2006, the court entered a bifurcated decree of divorce,

reserving all other issues for trial. Appendix at 23-24.
3.

On August 18, 2006, Mr. Ashby filed a motion to dismiss Ms.

Ashby’s contract claim. Appendix at 31-32.
4.

On August 28, 2006, Ms. Ashby filed an amended complaint adding a

claim for unjust enrichment and filed her response to the motion to dismiss.
Appendix at 33-46, 47-53.
5.

On September 27, 2006, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties,

the case was transferred to the Fourth District Court where it was assigned case
number 064402051 (the “divorce action”). Appendix at 71-72.
6.

On November 9, 2006, oral argument on the motion to dismiss was

heard by Commissioner Thomas Patton, at which time he recommended that the
motion to dismiss be granted. Specifically, the Commissioner ruled that, under
Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985), contract and unjust enrichment
claims must be filed separately from a divorce action. Appendix at 115-16.
7.

On December 11, 2006, the court (Judge Howard) adopted the

commissioner’s recommendation and dismissed from the divorce action the breach
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of contract and unjust enrichment claims for improper joinder. 1 Appendix at 12022. 2
8.

The divorce action went to trial before Judge Stott on December 12,

2007. Appendix at 193, 216. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to all issues
except alimony. Exhibit 1.
9.

On January 2, 2008, the trial court issued a memorandum decision

holding that Ms. Ashby was not entitled to an award of alimony. Appendix at 195204.
10.

On February 12, 2008, the trial court entered a final order denying any

alimony award to Ms. Ashby. Appendix at 207-10, especially 208.

1

Commissioner Patton signed the order dismissing these claims but from a review
of the record it appears that Judge Howard did not. See Appendix at 121. Despite
this apparent procedural error, the parties have acted as if the order was fully and
properly entered by the district court and Ms. Ashby agrees that, to the extent the
issue is relevant to this appeal at all, the Court should treat the order as though it
were properly entered by the trial court.
2

Based on that dismissal, on December 22, 2006, Ms. Ashby re-filed her breach of
contract and unjust enrichment claims as a separate action in a new complaint (the
“contract action”). On April 12, 2006, the trial court (Judge Steven Hansen)
dismissed the contract action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Ms. Ashby appealed that order and, on July 3, 2008, this Court reversed
that ruling, reinstated her breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims, and
ordered the case be remanded for further proceedings. Ashby v. Ashby, Case No.
20070362. On August 30, 2008, Mr. Ashby filed with the Utah Supreme Court a
petition for writ of certiorari, which remains pending.
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11.

On February 28, 2008, Ms. Ashby filed her notice of appeal.

Appendix at 211-13.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3
The Trial Court’s Findings of Fact
1.

Mr. and Ms. Ashby were married on December 6, 1997, and remained

so until April 12, 2006, when the Third District Court (Judge Terry Christiansen)
granted a bifurcated decree of divorce. Appendix at 23-24, 204.
2.

Prior to their marriage, Ms. Ashby had obtained an associates degree

in interior design. Appendix at 204.
3.

During the marriage, Mr. Ashby attended Brigham Young University

from 1997 until 2000, when he received a bachelors degree in chemical
engineering. Id. During this time, Mr. Ashby spent much of his time involved in
extracurricular activities designed to enhance his opportunity to be accepted to
medical school. Id. Accordingly, Ms. Ashby worked to support Mr. Ashby and
was the primary financial provider while he worked only part-time. Id.
4.

The medical school at the University of Utah was the couple’s first

choice for Mr. Ashby’s graduate studies because it would better accommodate Ms.
Ashby’s work. Id. Mr. Ashby, however, failed to apply by the established
3

Paragraphs 1 through 19 of the following statement of facts are taken from the
trial court’s memorandum decision entered January 2, 2008. Except as otherwise
noted, Ms. Ashby does not challenge the trial court’s findings.
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deadline. Id. Mr. Ashby did not disclose his failure to apply but simply told Ms.
Ashby that his application had been denied. Id. Instead, he accepted a position at
the St. Louis University medical school. Id.
5.

Ms. Ashby testified that Mr. and Ms. Ashby’s moving to St. Louis

cost her her employment with her interior design mentor and the opportunity to
eventually take over his substantial practice. Appendix at 203.
6.

Mr. Ashby attended medical school from approximately 2000 to

2004. Id. During that time, he incurred student loans for educational and living
expenses each semester. Id. From 2004 to 2005, Mr. Ashby participated in a
medical internship at St. Louis University. Id.
7.

During this time, Ms. Ashby started her own interior design business

and thereby became the primary financial provider. Id. Mr. Ashby assisted Ms.
Ashby with certain aspects of the business. Id. After a difficult first year, the
business became successful. Id. Ms. Ashby, however, limited her work to
temporary projects, avoiding permanent work because of Mr. and Ms. Ashby’s
mutual plans for their family. Id.
8.

During the course of the marriage, Ms. Ashby found out that Mr.

Ashby was involved with pornography. Appendix at 202. Indeed, in February
2001, Ms. Ashby was diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease, even though
both parties testified that they had never had sexual relations with others.
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Appendix at 201-02. Throughout this period, Ms. Ashby urged Mr. Ashby to seek
counseling for pornography, which he undertook in Utah and in St. Louis.
Appendix at 202. Ms. Ashby asked Mr. Ashby to see a counselor on a weekly
basis. Appendix at 201. For three months, he falsely reported to her that he was
attending counseling and he fabricated various aspects of the sessions and the
progress he was purportedly making. Id.
9.

Based on Mr. Ashby’s involvement with pornography and his

deceitful conduct toward Ms. Ashby, the trial court found that Mr. Ashby’s
conduct contributed substantially to the destruction of the marriage and found him
to be at fault. Appendix at 198, 201.
10.

Mr. and Ms. Ashby separated about May 1, 2005, when Ms. Ashby

returned to Utah. Appendix at 203. At about that time, Mr. Ashby moved to
Chicago to begin his residency. Id.
11.

At the time of trial, Mr. Ashby was in his third year of residency at a

hospital in Chicago and was expected to finish his residency and the ensuing
fellowship in about 2010. Id.
12.

At the time of trial, Ms. Ashby was employed as an interior designer,

the field in which she has worked for about ten years. Appendix at 202.
13.

Mr. and Ms Ashby both currently earn about the same monthly

income of $4,000, and those incomes are not expected to change significantly over
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the next three years. Id. Both parties’ living expenses are approximately equal,
which use up essentially all of their respective incomes, leaving little if anything
for savings. Id. The standard of living they both enjoy is about the same as when
they were married. Id. The parties had no children during or as a result of their
marriage. Id.
14.

Mr. Ashby intends to become a non-interventional, diagnostic

radiologist. Id. Mr. Ashby expects his income to increase to an amount four or
five times its current level when he begins his work as such after his residency and
fellowship. Id.
15.

The trial court found

that the testimony at trial by both the parties’ financial experts
established that [Mr. Ashby’s] future income cannot be predicted with
any reasonable degree of probability. . . . Because [Mr. Ashby] has a
medical degree, is doing his medical residency, and will be
completing a fellowship in the next few years, he has the ability to
earn more money than he is presently earning as a result of both their
efforts. Based only on these facts, however, the Court cannot
reasonably impute any specific amount of income.”
Appendix at 198-99.
16.

The trial court found that the marriage lasted almost eight years and

concluded that it was of “‘short’ duration.” Appendix at 199, 200.
17.

The trial court found that Ms. Ashby did not work in a business

owned or operated by Mr. Ashby. Appendix at 200.
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18.

The trial court found that Ms. Ashby “contributed directly to [Mr.

Ashby’s] increase in skill by allowing him to attend school during the marriage
while being the primary financial provider.” Id.
19.

The trial court also found that “[Mr. Ashby’s] circumstances have

allowed [Ms. Ashby] to gain substantial occupational experiences in the interior
design field. Not only has she worked with established interior design companies
and on an allegedly multi-million dollar project, but she has also obtained skills in
doing so that have enabled her to start her own business, which, by her own
account, became a success.” Id. Further, the trial court specifically found that
“[b]oth [Mr. Ashby’ and Ms. Ashby’s] earning capacities have been enhanced
through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage.” Appendix at 199.
Ms. Ashby’s Objections to the Trial Court’s Findings of Facts
20.

Ms. Ashby does not object to any of the trial court’s findings of fact

except for its findings: 1) that Mr. Ashby’s circumstances “allowed” her to
develop her own professional abilities and opportunities and that Mr. Ashby has
contributed to her greater earning capacity, and 2) that there was not sufficient
evidence from which it could impute Mr. Ashby’s future income. Ms. Ashby
objects to these findings based on the following marshalling of the relevant
evidence.
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A.

Mr. Ashby’s Purported Contribution to Ms. Ashby’s
Circumstances

21.

There is no evidence in the record from which the trial court could

have properly made the findings described in paragraph 19 above. The following
is all of the evidence related to that topic.
22.

Ms. Ashby had desires to get her bachelors degree in architecture,

although Mr. Ashby acknowledged those desires as being raised only near the time
of the parties’ separation. Appendix at 216 at 12-13, 63. Ms. Ashby testified that
she gave up that desire because of her need to support him. Id. at 63.
23.

Additionally, the evidence clearly established that Ms. Ashby, even

prior to the marriage, subordinated her career goals to the need to move with Mr.
Ashby as he sought to develop his career. Id. at 14-15. This included Ms. Ashby
giving up her job in Salt Lake to move to Provo before the parties married. Id. at
63-65. Then, she began working for Lance Turner in Provo about seven months
before they moved to St. Louis. Id. at 64. This job provided her with substantial
opportunities to work in the high-end residential design industry. Id. at 64. When
Mr. Ashby was given notice of his acceptance to the St. Louis medical school, the
parties had to leave Utah within three weeks, which interrupted Ms. Ashby’s work
with Mr. Turner. Id. at 64-65. This departure happened around the time that Mr.
Turner was talking about turning over his business to Ms. Ashby, a “huge
opportunity.” Id. at 64-65. Indeed, Mr. Turner actually offered his business to Ms.
10

24.

In St. Louis, Ms. Ashby began doing contract work with architects

and designers in that area. Id. at 66. The first year was difficult but then it became
successful. Id. at 66-67. Despite this success, Ms. Ashby always knew that she
would eventually be leaving the area to move away with her husband. Id. at 67.
25.

When Ms. Ashby returned to Utah at the time the marriage fell apart,

she was “designing a prototype for a . . . a company in St. Louis, as well as Lance
Turner. [She] was working in his office that summer and [Mr. Ashby] was
harassing and calling his office and Lance Turner asked me not to work at his
office. [She] had to walk away from the job and [she] had to – [she] decided to
quit [her] business and start working for an architectural firm [in] downtown Salt
Lake City.” Id. at 81-82.
26.

Finally, Mr. Ashby testified that he helped Ms. Ashby with her

interior decorating business in St. Louis. Specifically, “I’d help her do all of her
accounting-type stuff, made copies, ran -- . . . Every once in a while, I’d actually
help with the work.” Mr. Ashby was not paid for this work. Id. at 108.
B.

Purported Insufficiency of the Evidence from which to Impute
Mr. Ashby’s Future Income

27.

As noted above, Ms. Ashby objects to the trial court’s finding that it

could not impute a future income to Mr. Ashby based upon the evidence before the
11

court. The following is all of the evidence concerning Mr. Ashby’s potential future
income. Ms. Ashby submits that this evidence is more than sufficient to provide a
substantial basis for imputing Mr. Ashby’s future income.
28.

First, Ms. Ashby offered Exhibit 6 which was received into evidence.

Id. at 50. Exhibit 6 is a report that was prepared by Mark Allen Hedrick, Mr.
Ashby’s expert witness. 4 On page 2 of Exhibit 6, Mr. Hedrick indicated that
according to the 2006 AMGA Physician Compensation Survey:
In the Eastern United States, the average income of a
Diagnostic Non-Interventional Radiologist is $349,575. In the
Western United States, the average income of a Diagnostic NonInterventional Radiologist is $404,877. In the Southern United States,
the average income of a Diagnostic Non-Interventional Radiologist is
$384,960. In the Northern United States, the average income of a
Diagnostic Non-Interventional Radiologist is $415,753.
29.

Mr. Hedrick’s report further indicated that “[a]ccording to ‘2005-2006

Physician Compensation Review: A Compendium of Physician Compensation
Studies Annually Profiled in Modern Healthcare’ published by Merritt, Hawkins &
Associates, the compensation for Radiologist [sic] ranges from $209,365 to
$411,131.”

4

Later in the trial, Mr. Ashby had Exhibit 7 marked but that exhibit was never
offered or received into evidence. Id. at 99. A comparison of Exhibits 6 and 7
show that Exhibit 6 is the same report as included in Exhibit 7 but Exhibit 6 does
not include the exhibits to the expert report that are included in Exhibit 7.
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30.

Thus, based on Mr. Ashby’s own expert’s report, the trial court could

have found that the range in compensation for radiologists generally throughout the
country as of 2006 ranged from $209,365 to $415,753, and for diagnostic, noninterventional radiologists, depending on their region of employment, to range
from $349,575 to $415,753.
31.

When called as a witness at trial by Mr. Ashby, Mr. Hedrick testified

that there were a number of variables that prevented him from being able to
“evaluate” Mr. Ashby’s future potential income. Appendix at 216 at 100.
Specifically, Mr. Hedrick noted that the region and the type of facility of Mr.
Ashby’s future employment would affect his actual income. Id. at 100-01. He
also indicated that the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 might have a negative impact
on radiologist salaries, though he could not say that it actually is having such an
impact. Id. at 100.
32.

Mr. Hedrick indicated that, with the exception of the Deficit

Reduction Act of 2005, none of the variables he discussed would potentially
change the average radiologist income by more than ten or fifteen percent. Id. at
106. Even as to the federal statute, he indicated that he did not know how the new
law would in fact affect radiologist income. Id. at 100, 106-07.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Even though the trial court was required by statute to fashion an alimony
award that was based on equitable principles, the trial court’s decision in this case
to deny Ms. Ashby any award of alimony was fundamentally unfair and
inequitable. For many years, she sacrificed her own professional goals in order to
help Mr. Ashby obtain a medical degree and license. Now that he is on the
threshold of realizing the financial rewards that come with such achievement, he
has asked the courts to allow him to keep all of the benefits thereof without sharing
those benefits with Ms. Ashby, who contributed greatly to his success. The trial
court granted Mr. Ashby’s request for the sole apparent reason that there was
insufficient evidence for the court to impute Mr. Ashby’s future income levels.
While that finding was clearly erroneous, even were it accurate, it does not justify
denying Ms. Ashby any recovery. To do so denies her the equity that the courts
are required to give.
Moreover, the trial court failed to consider certain specific aspects of the
relationship between Mr. and Ms. Ashby that it should have considered. These
include the fact that Mr. Ashby was found to be at fault and responsible for the
demise of this marriage. These facts and related statutory provisions provide a
further basis for an alimony award being granted to Ms. Ashby.
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Finally, allowing Mr. Ashby to appropriate to himself all of the benefits that
come with his advanced education without ensuring that they inure to Ms. Ashby’s
benefit as well will substantially undermine the marital institution. That is a result
that would be contrary to this State’s public policy supporting marriage as a
socially beneficial institution.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In reviewing a trial court’s decision to award or deny alimony, the appellate

court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Richardson v. Richardson, 2008 UT
57, ¶ 5; Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). The trial court’s findings
of fact are subject to clear error review. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Elmer v. Elmer, 776
P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1989). A trial court’s decision to consider or not consider the
parties’ fault in determining alimony should be subject to an abuse of discretion
standard. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(b); Montiel, 2005 UT 48 ¶¶ 9, 20, 122 P.3d
571, 575, 578.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS CONCERNING MR. ASHBY’S
FUTURE INCOME AND HIS CONTRIBUTION TO MS. ASHBY’S
CAREER WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
A.

The Evidence Presented at Trial Does Not Support a Finding that
Mr. Ashby’s Future Income Cannot Be Imputed

The trial court found that Mr. Ashby’s future earnings could not be imputed
based on the evidence at trial. Specifically, the court found that Mr. Ashby, after
15

finishing his residency and fellowship, will have the ability to earn more money
than he now does because of his medical degree which is due to both parties’
efforts. Despite this, the court stated that “[b]ased only on these facts, however,
the court cannot reasonably impute any specific amount of income.”
In making this decision, the trial court ignored uncontroverted evidence that
was presented. Specifically, Ms. Ashby, introduced a copy of the report prepared
by Mr. Hedrick, Mr. Ashby’s own expert. In that report, Mr. Hedrick showed that
current income from radiologists ranges from $209,365 to $415,753. While Mr.
Hedrick tried to hedge his testimony by noting various factors that could affect any
individual radiologist’s income during the next several years, he acknowledged
that, with one exception, none of those factors would affect a radiologist’s income
by more than ten or fifteen percent. As to the other factor, the federal Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, Mr. Hedrick’s testimony establishes that he was unable to
give an estimate of how that factor might affect the radiologist’s income.
Accordingly, even if the trial court decided all the inferences in Mr. Ashby’s
favor, it should have found that Mr. Ashby, after completing his residency and
fellowship, will be able to earn at least $177,960.25. 5 There was no evidence

5

This is calculated as $209,365 less 15% (i.e., $31,404.75). Ms. Ashby believes
that the court should have looked only to the evidence of non-interventional,
diagnostic radiologist salaries which range from $349,575 to $415,753. Taking the
low end of that range and subtracting fifteen percent yields $297,138.75.
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introduced by either party that would undermine this conclusion. Indeed, Mr.
Ashby himself testified that he expected to earn upon finishing his residency four
to five times his current income of $48,000 per year, i.e., $192,000 to $240,000.
To refuse to find that Mr. Ashby’s future income could not be imputed at at least a
level within fifteen percent of the amount that Mr. Hedrick showed was the low
end of the radiologist income range was clearly erroneous.
B.

The Evidence Presented At Trial Does Not Support a Finding
That Mr. Ashby Has Contributed to Ms. Ashby’s Current Career
Status

The trial court’s findings that Mr. Ashby’s circumstances in going to
medical school “allowed” Ms. Ashby to pursue and develop her career and that Mr.
Ashby contributed to Ms. Ashby’s increased earning potential are erroneous.
There was no evidence presented by either party suggesting that Mr. Ashby’s
pursuit of his education in any way assisted her in pursuing her career. Indeed, the
evidence was entirely to the contrary.
First, Ms. Ashby testified, without contradiction, that Mr. Ashby’s
acceptance to medical school in St. Louis had a direct, immediate, and negative
impact on Ms. Ashby’s career by causing her to have to leave her employment
with Lance Turner and to give up the opportunity to eventually take over his
business. Moreover, because she knew that they did not intend to remain in St.
Louis beyond Mr. Ashby’s medical school years, Ms. Ashby did not seek a

17

permanent job in her industry in St. Louis but instead concentrated on small,
temporary projects. This slowed her career development down. 6 Thus, nothing
about Mr. Ashby’s medical training can be given credit for whatever career success
Ms. Ashby has achieved.
It is true that Mr. Ashby testified that he assisted Ms. Ashby with her
accounting and other matters related to her business in St. Louis. The handling of
mundane, non-professional aspects of a business is not sufficient to justify a
finding that Mr. Ashby should be credited with Ms. Ashby’s success.
Accordingly, the Court should hold that the trial court’s findings in this
regard were clearly erroneous and should direct that the trial court, on remand, not
consider this alleged factor in any way that would cause an award alimony not to
be granted to Ms. Ashby or that would reduce the amount of such an award.
III.

IN DENYING MS. ASHBY ANY AWARD OF ALIMONY, THE
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
A.

The Trial Court’s Order Denying an Award of Alimony Is Unfair
and Inequitable

The touchstone of an alimony award is equity. “When a decree of divorce is
rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children,

6

This does not even consider the detriment Mr. Ashby caused after the marriage
failed and Ms. Ashby returned to Utah and her employment with Mr. Turner.
Specifically, because Mr. Ashby harassed Ms. Ashby while she was at work, Mr.
Turner terminated her employment.
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property, debts or obligations, and parties.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1)
(emphases added); accord Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c) (in devising an alimony
order, “the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles”
(emphases added)); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (“The
overarching aim of a property division, and of the decree of which it and the
alimony award are subsidiary parts, is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result
between the parties.”); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985) (“In a
divorce proceeding, the trial court may make such orders concerning . . . alimony
as are equitable.”).
In this case, the trial court’s denial of an alimony award violates the
equitable principles that should govern matters such as this. Indeed, this Court has
previously reasoned that cases involving a student spouse and working spouse that
separate at about the time the student spouse finishes his or her studies need
consideration that goes beyond traditional alimony analysis. Specifically, in
Petersen v. Petersen¸ 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987), the court stated that, when a
marriage ends long after the student spouse has earned a degree and obtained a
license, an analysis of the parties’ then-current income patterns will be sufficient to
reward the working spouse for his or her assistance in the obtaining of the degree
and license. It then distinguished that fact pattern from the one now before the
Court:
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In another kind of recurring case, typified by [In re Marriage
of] Graham, [194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978)], where divorce
occurs shortly after the degree is obtained, traditional alimony
analysis would often work hardship because, while both spouses have
modest incomes at the time of divorce, the one is on the threshold of a
significant increase in earnings. Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed
so the other could attain a degree is precluded from enjoying the
anticipated dividends the degree will ordinarily provide. . . . In such
cases, alimony analysis must become more creative to achieve
fairness, and an award of "rehabilitative" or "reimbursement"
alimony, not terminable upon remarriage, may be appropriate. See,
e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984);
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
Petersen¸ 737 P.2d at 242 n.4. In other words, equity and fairness require the
courts to recognize the work and effort that the working spouse gave to assist the
student spouse in achieving his academic accomplishments, especially where those
accomplishments make the student spouse more likely to obtain financial success.
Indeed, nationwide, the trend is for courts to recognize the importance of
avoiding a windfall to the student spouse to the detriment of the working spouse.
As the Kentucky Court of Appeals acknowledged, “[a]s a matter of economic
reality the most valuable asset acquired by either party during this six-year
marriage was the husband’s increased earning capacity. . . . In cases such as this,
equity demands that courts seek extraordinary remedies to prevent extraordinary
injustice.” Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269-70 (Ky. App. 1979); accord In
re Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, 241, 470 N.E.2d 551, 557 (Ill. App. 1984)
(noting that although there is a “seeming divergence of opinion [among various
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states] on the characterization of a degree or license, there is nevertheless clear
agreement that the contributing spouse should be entitled to some form of
compensation for the financial efforts and support provided to the student spouse
in the expectation that the marital unit would prosper in the future as a direct result
of the couple’s previous sacrifices.”). The Inman court is wholly correct that this
situation justifies “extraordinary remedies” to avoid the injustice presented. In
Utah, with one exception, the statutes that provide for an order imposing alimony
are sufficient because they expressly direct the courts to enter an equitable order.
That one exception is the need, as the Peterson court noted, to order alimony that
shall continue beyond the remarriage of the receiving spouse and beyond the
length of the marriage.
In a case such as this, alimony should be based upon the future expected
earnings of the student spouse. That spouse is in a position to earn a substantially
higher income because of the efforts of the working spouse. The student spouse
should not be allowed to take the advantage of the working spouse’s contributions
to the marriage and the higher education and, after having received those
contributions, leave without consequence. Mr. Ashby should not be allowed to
obtain Ms. Ashby’s substantial contributions to his medical career (which were
given at great personal cost to Ms. Ashby) and then leave her behind while he
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takes away for himself the very benefits to which she contributed so substantially.
That is not fairness or equity.
Rather, in this case, fairness and equity require that the trial court grant Ms.
Ashby an award of alimony. Indeed, this case demands an extraordinary award in
the sense that it should be a permanent award. The evidence at trial was that Mr.
Ashby would finish his residency and fellowship in approximately 2010. At that
point, only about three years would remain of the normal alimony period, see Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9), not nearly enough time for Ms. Ashby to recoup the value
of the efforts she contributed to the parties’ marriage and that were then taken from
her.
Even were it true (as the discussion above shows it is not) that Mr. Ashby’s
future income cannot be imputed at this time (because he is still in his residency),
the trial court should have made an order that would easily allow for the future
modification of alimony when Mr. Ashby’s future income became more
susceptible of proof. For instance, the trial court could have ordered that he pay
her alimony in the amount of $1 per month until such time as he would begin his
post-residency practice, at which time the alimony order would be subject to
review (again with specific provision that the alimony obligation will not terminate
upon Ms. Ashby’s remarriage, cohabitation, or the expiration of the length of the
marriage).
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B.

The Trial Court’s Denial of an Alimony Award Was Contrary to
Statutory Direction

The divorce statute provides a specific list of factors that the trial “shall
consider” in determining whether and how much to award as alimony. The list
includes the following:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
the length of the marriage;
whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children
requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or
operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education
received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to
attend school during the marriage.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a). 7 Although this list of factors is expressly declared
to be non-exclusive, the trial court must consider each of these factors and may
then consider others that are appropriate to the specific marriage.
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In interpreting these statutory provisions, the courts have noted a number of times
that the “most important function” of these provisions is to ensure that the
receiving spouse is able to maintain her standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage and prevent her from becoming a public charge. English v. English, 565
P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977) (citing Nace v. Nace, 107 Ariz. 411, 489 P.2d 48, 50
(Arizona 1971). It clear, however, that this is only the primary, not the sole,
purpose of alimony. The statute as a whole makes it clear that the overall purpose
is to arrange things between the divorcing parties in a manner that is equitable.
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In this case, the trial court considered the financial condition and earning
capacity of each of the parties. The court also noted that the parties did not have
any children and that Ms. Ashby did not work in a business owned by Mr. Ashby.
Next, the court found that the marriage lasted eight years. Finally, the court also
stated that Ms. Ashby had contributed to Mr. Ashby’s earning capacity by paying
for and allowing Mr. Ashby to obtain his education. The court then added its
clearly erroneous conclusion that Mr. Ashby contributed to Ms. Ashby’s increased
earning capacity as well. Even though it is absolutely clear that the increase in his
earning capacity far outweighs the increase in hers, the court apparently considered
these “facts” as evenly balancing each other out. In this, the trial court erred both
because its finding that Mr. Ashby contributed to her greater earning power was
clearly erroneous and also because the court somehow reached the conclusion the
two were of equal value.
Accordingly, the court met its minimum statutory obligation in considering
each of the required statutory factors (even though some of those considerations
were demonstrably wrong). In addition to the mandatory factors listed above,
however, the statute identifies other factors that may or ought to be considered. 8
One such factor is described in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(e):

8

One of these additional factors is the fault of the parties. Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(8)(b). This factor is discussed in more detail in the next section.
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When a marriage of long duration[9] dissolves on the threshold
of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the
collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing
the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and
awarding alimony.
In this case it is beyond argument that the contributions, support, and assistance
Ms. Ashby gave to Mr. Ashby during their marriage contributed substantially to
Mr. Ashby’s earning capacity. Under this statutory section, the trial court should
have at least considered making “a compensating adjustment in dividing the
marital property and awarding alimony.” Id. Because the trial court concluded that
the Ashby marriage was of short duration, it is apparent that it did not consider
making an alimony award under this section. If, as Ms. Ashby argues, the Ashby
marriage actually was one of long duration, that failure to consider this factor was
a failure to exercise discretion which is an abuse of discretion. Montiel, 2005 UT
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The trial court cited Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987), as authority
for its conclusion that the Ashby marriage was of short duration. The Boyle case
considered a marriage that lasted seven years as being “short.” On the other hand,
in the more recent case Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214; 138 P.3d 84, the court
determined that a marriage that lasted eleven years was one of long duration. Ms.
Ashby submits that her eight-and-a-half-year marriage to Mr. Ashby was of
sufficiently long duration to bring § 30-3-5(8)(e) into play. Ms. Ashby suggests
that whether a marriage was of long or short duration depends not so much on how
many years it lasted but on the amount of support the working spouse gave to the
student spouse during the marriage.
25

48 ¶ 9; 122 P.3d 571, 575 (“A failure to exercise discretion is generally
encompassed within the meaning of abuse of discretion.” ).
C.

The Trial Court’s Order Denying Alimony Ignored Its Own
Finding that Mr. Ashby Was at Fault in the Failure of This
Marriage

The trial court made an express finding that Mr. Ashby’s involvement in
pornography and deceitful behavior toward Ms. Ashby contributed substantially to
the breakdown of this marriage. The trial court did not, however, consider that
fault in making its alimony decision. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(b) provides
expressly that “[t]he court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.”
While it is true that the statutory provision does not require, but merely
allows, the court to consider fault, it is clear from the statutory language that the
trial court’s decision to consider or not consider is a matter of discretion. As noted
above, “[a] failure to exercise discretion is generally encompassed within the
meaning of abuse of discretion.” Montiel, 2005 UT 48 ¶ 9; 122 P.3d 571, 575. At
a minimum that should mean that, where a finding of fault has been made, the trial
court should state its reasons for not considering that fault in determining whether
to award alimony and/or in determining the amount of any such award. Id. ¶ 20;
122 P.3d at 578. Requiring such reasons be stated will facilitate appellate review
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when a party contends that the court abused its discretion in refusing to award
alimony despite a finding of fault. Id.
In this case, the trial court made a clear finding that Mr. Ashby was at fault
for the disintegration of the marriage. The court did not, however, state why it
chose not to consider Mr. Ashby’s fault in deciding alimony in this case. Given
this record, this Court is left with nothing but to presume the trial court chose not
to exercise its discretion, which is itself an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this
Court should direct the trial court, on remand, to state the reasons it chooses to
consider or not consider Mr. Ashby’s fault in determining the alimony to be
awarded.
D.

The Trial Court’s Order Undermines the Marriage Institution

In order for a marriage to survive and prosper, both parties must contribute
substantially of their own effort to the joint undertaking. If, however, a spouse
knows that her contributions to the marriage may be wholly and unilaterally
appropriated by the other spouse to his own benefit, leaving her worse off than if
she had never married or never made those contributions, she will have
substantially less incentive to make those contributions. Without those
contributions, the marriage will suffer and, in many cases, not survive.
Accordingly, it is important to the institution of marriage that individuals
realize that they cannot expect to take advantage of the other party’s generosity but
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not be obligated to that other party, either through continuing make adequate
reciprocal efforts at the marriage or through alimony. It is such an understanding
that gives individuals the willingness to continue to work at the marital relationship
even when things are difficult. If the Court wishes to protect the institution of
marriage, it should make it clear that a spouses that receives inordinately of the
other spouse’s marital contributions will be obligated to return those contributions
in the event of a divorce. A ruling in favor of Ms. Ashby will enhance the favor
with which the State of Utah treats marriage.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Ashby asks this Court to reverse the
decision of the trial court denying her an award of alimony, and remand the case
for the determination of an alimony consistent with the principles of law and
equity.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2008.
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ADDENDA

1

ADDENDUM A

1

30-3-5.

Disposition of property -- Maintenance and health care of parties
and children -- Division of debts -- Court to have continuing
jurisdiction -- Custody and parent-time -- Determination of
alimony -- Nonmeritorious petition for modification.

(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
...
...
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in
the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with
Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that
existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of
living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize
the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of
both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court
1

may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and
awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may
consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the
marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony
to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the
payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to
share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the
court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of
years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony,
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a
longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are
determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse
is cohabitating with another person.
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